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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1953 TERM
recapitulating the New York law on the subject. Trespass is an
intentional harm at least to the extent that the actor must intend
the act which amounts to or results in an unlawful invasion. Such
invasion must be a proximate or inevitable result of the actor's
wilful act, or one which is done so negligently that it amounts to
awilful act.
The instant case-was concerned with an alleged underground
movement of noxious fluid (gasoline) from defendant's storage
tank to plaintiff's water well. The only evidence adduced tended
merely to prove that plaintiff's well water contained a heavy concentration of gasoline similar in type to that stored in defendant's tank on adjacent property.
The leading ease in New York, and the first of its sort to be
ruled on, is Dillon v. Acme Oil Co.30 There, defendant oil company
was exonerated from liability for the pollution of plaintiff's well
on adjoining property caused by defendant's discharge on to its
land of chemicals permeating the soil. Absent negligence and
knowledge of subterranean water courses, there can be no liability
if such courses became contaminated by a person's carrying on a
legitimate business with care and skill.
The decision in the Dillon case as precedent precludes a finding 6f liability in the instant ease, for in the latter there was not
even a showing that defendant intentionally permitted gasoline to
permeate the soil, while in the former, chemicals were intentionally discharged. Hence, the general rule in New York evolves,.
that excepting activities of an extra hazardous nature, an unintentional or non-negligent physical invasion of another's property will not subject the actor to liability for harm ensuing there-

from.8 '
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The requirement of law that injuries, to be compensable, must
arise "out of and in the course of the employment"' often has
Several
necessitated a searching analysis of questions of fact
such cases were decided this term.
30. 49 Hun 565. 2 N. Y. Supp. 289 (Sup. Ct. 1888).
31. RESTATEMENT, Torts, § 166; N. Y. Steam Co. v. Foundation Co., 195 N. Y.
143, 87 N. E. 765 (1909).
1. WoRKM's COUMPNSATION LAW § 10.
2. Such problems as frolic and detour, tests of re-entry, business v. pleasure, inter
alia, have caused the courts some uneasiness. For recent discussions in this jurisdiction,
see, e. g., 3 BFLO. L. REv. 167 (1953) ; Comment, Diversionary Activities in WorkmeWs
Compensation, 17 ALBANY L. REv. 283 (1953).
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In Penzara v. Maffla Bros.,' claimant, employed as a handyman in an automobile supply and repair shop, was permitted during slack time to work on his own automobile, and while thus
engaged, was struck in the eye by a clip he was fashioning for his
own use. The employer expressly conceded that he permitted use
of company tools for these personal activities during business
hours, and supplied and paid for parts thus used by his employees.
The court found (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting) that the injury
was compensable, and observed that the case fell squarely within
the meaning of a passage in Davis v. Newsweek Magazine'.where
it was concluded after a review of cases involving social or recreational activities:
Careful examination of these cases reveals that there is one
operative factor common to all. In each and every instance
the employee had been directed, as part of his duties, to remain
in a particularplace or locality until directed otherwise or for a
specified length of time. In those circumstances, the rule applied
is simply that the employee is not expected to wait immobile,
but may indulge in any reasonable activity at that place, and
if he does so the risk inherent in such activity is an incident
of his employment. 5
Congdon v. Klett 6 involved an accident which occurred while
the employee was swimming, with permission of the employer, in
the employer's swimming pool adjacent to the business property.
It appeared that this was customary, but there was evidence that
the injury occurred shortly after working hours, although the
recreation may have been initiated earlier.
Here the court denied recovery, again quoting Davis,7 and
distinguishing Penzaral on grounds it comprised a situation within the intent of the Davis dictum, while in the instant case the
recreation was undertaken off the business premises, and the

3. 307 N. Y. 15, 119 N. E. 2d 570 (1954).
4. 305 N. Y. 20, 27-28, 110 N. E. 2d 406, 409 (1952) ; noted, 3 Brw. L. R,. 59
(1953).
5. But the Penzara dissent here suggested that claimant was not merely passing
time because he was required to be present, and contended that the injury resulted from
the hazards of an activity voluntarily undertaken and in no way directed or organized
by the employer.
6. 307 N. Y. 218, 120 N. E. 2d 796 (1954).

7. Supra, note 4,
8. Supra, note 3. Judge Van Voorhis did not join in distinguishing and upholding
Pen:ara. As noted above, he had there dissented. The Congdon decision was otherwise
unanimous.
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presence of the employee, while tolerated, was not required by -the
employer."
It may be noted that in both cases the court emphasized the
Davis formulation, which it apparently regards as controlling in
recreation cases. 10 But the application of this rule is still far
from clear; for example, whether the court would have permitted
recovery if claimant in the Congdon ease had sustained injury
during working hours, although not on the business premises, is
arguable, as is the question whether the location of the pool within
the working area would have resulted in a different decision.
Perry v. Town of Cherry Valley," presented the question
whether the death of a town superintendent of highways while he
was blasting rock on privately owned lands was compensable. It
appeared that the performance of such work was a custom of
sometwenty years' duration; town equipment was used, and the
town collected fees for the service.
The court held (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting) that although
the work was performed pursuant to contracts which were violative of municipal authority, 12 the employee's death was compensable 3 so long as the legality of his employment status was unquestioned. 4
9. In passing, the court suggested that to grant an award here"... would serve
to warn employers that, if they concern themselves with the social and recreational
activities of their employees, even though the activities be conducted after hours and be
totally unconnected with the work for which the employees have been hired, they run
the risk of being subjected to liability for every accident and injury arising from such
activities." 307 N. Y. at 223-224, 120 N. E. 2d at 799.
10. These cases, of course, are to be distinguished from those in which the employer organizes and sponsors athletics or other activities as a fringe benefit to employees. See, Tedesco v. General Electric Co., 305 N. Y. 544, 114 N. E. 2d 33 (1953);
Wilson v. General Motors Corp., 298 N. Y. 468, 84 N. E. 2d 781 (1949).
11. 307 N. Y. 427, 121 N. E. 2d 402 (1954).
12. A town is a municipal corporation, TowN LAw § 2. Its powers are derived
from the Legislature, Wells v. Town of Salina, 119 N. Y. 280, 23 N. E. 870 (1890) ;
Holroyd v. Town of Indian Lake, 180 N. Y. 318, 73 N. E. 36 (1905) ; and are confined
to public purposes, Mayor v. Ray, 19 Wall. 468 (1875) ; Wells v. Town of Salina, supra.
"No power is vested in the town board to use highway machinery for private individuals
and such a use would not in any sense be a town purpose." 3 Op. ST. ComPn, aum
234, 235 (1947).
13. Under WoaKMN's COmPENSATON LAW §2 (3), a municipal corporation is
an employer; and injuries to its employees engaged in hazardous work are compensable.
Woax='s COmPENSATiON LAW § 3 (1).

The fact that decedent was an officer of

the town does not disqualify him from coverage. TowN LAw § 20 (1) ; Dann v. Town
of Veteran, 278 N. Y. 461, 17 N. E. 2d 130 (1938).
14. ".

.

. Where the employment has been entered upon and the relationship of

employer and employee established, the violation of any statute, whether penal or otherwise, does not render the Workmen's Compensation Law inapplicable." Ulrich v. Terminal Operating Corp., 186 Misc. 145, 146, 59 N. Y. S. 2d 226, aff'd, 271 App. Div. 930,
67 N. Y. S. 2d 590 (2d Dep't 1947). Cf. Clarke v. Town of Russia, 283 N. Y. 272, 28
N. E. 2d 833 (1940), in which compensation was denied where it appeared that decedent
was a member of the Town Board, and his contract of employment was void ab initio, in
view of the instructions to the Board that its members could not be hired to work on
highways.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
The dissent suggested that the legality of decedent's employment status was not unchallengeable: "[Wihen he contracted to
do private work for a private individual, in a legal sense he ceased
to act as the superintendent of highways . .
and thus lost his
status as an employee.'
But the majority found on the authority of Dann v. Town of
Veteran 7 that the illegality of the work contract did not affect the
validity of decedent's employment for purposes of Workmen's
Compensation, distinguishing Clarke v. Town of Russia s on
grounds that the employment contract in that case was illegal in
its inception.
Aggravation of Injuries
In Sullivan v. B & A Const., Inc.,,9 claimant had previously
suffered two compensable injuries to his right knee, as a result
of which his knee occasionally "locked" so that he was temporarily deprived of use of his right leg. The court unanimously
held ° that injuries suffered in an automobile accident wherein
claimant's knee locked so that he was unable to apply the brake,
were not compensable.
Claimant admitted that his knee had locked several times
previously while he was driving. It was found that although the
accident almost certainly would not have occurred but for the
original knee injuries, the chain of causation was broken by claimant's own act of driving despite knowledge of his disability and
the hazards involved.2 '
There has been some conflict of authority as to whether the
prior compensable injury must be the "proximate" cause of the
subsequent injury, or merely a "but for" cause. A substantial
15. 307 N. Y. at 432, 121 N. E. 2d at 405.
16. A contract between a municipality and one of its officers is against public
policy and is illegal. Beebe v. Supervisors of Sullivan County, 64 Hun 377, aff'd 142
N. Y. 631, 37 N. E. 566 (1894). Such a contract is wholly void, not merely voidable.
Clarke v. Town of Russia, supra, note 14; 10 McQui.wN, MUNxicrPAL CoaRoATIots
(3d ed. 1949), 196-197. A compensation award was not be based on a void, illegal contract. Su4hura v.Horowitz, 242 N. Y. 523, 152 N. E. 411 (1926); Herbold v. Neff,
200 App. Div. 244, 193 N. Y. Supp. 244 (3d Dep't 1922).
17. Supra, note 13. It may be noteworthy that in the Dann case coverage was
specifically provided for claimant by name in the insurance contract.
18. Supra, note 14.
19. 307 N. Y. 161, 120 N. E. 2d 694 (1954).
20. Reversing 282 App. Div. 788, 122 N. Y. S. 2d 571 (3d Dep't 1953), which
had unanimously upheld an award by the Workmen's Compensation Board.
21, For the same rule in other jurisdictions, see, 1 LARSON;, WORYMEN'S COMPENSATOiN LAW 183-184 (1952), and Note, 102 A. L. R. 790 (1936).

